WhatsUpp with Sender Keys? Analysis, Improvements and Security Proofs

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Work under submission!


Group Messaging


- Widely used messaging protocols claim security and end-to-end encryption. But this is vague and often misleading... ↔
- For example, Telegram has no end-to-end encryption (in groups).
- Sender Keys is the protocol used in WhatsApp and Signal for groups; surprisingly, no formal analysis exists! ②
- Known group messaging models [1, 2, 3] do not suit Sender Keys. (2)
- Can we formalise Sender Keys in a meaningful security model? ③


What is group messaging?

Secure, correct, asynchronous algorithms for:

- **Send:** message m encrypted $\longrightarrow C$.
- **Recv:** retrieve ciphertext C, decrypt it, and obtain the ID of the sender \longrightarrow (m, ID).
- **Exec:** execute a group change: *create*, *add*, *remove* or *update* $\longrightarrow T$.
- **Proc:** process *T* and apply group change.







References

- [1] Joël Alwen, Sandro Coretti, Yevgeniy Dodis, and Yiannis Tselekounis. Security analysis and improvements for the IETF MLS standard for group messaging. CRYPTO, 2020.
- [2] Joël Alwen, Sandro Coretti, Yevgeniy Dodis, and Yiannis Tselekounis. Modular Design of Secure Group Messaging Protocols and the Security of MLS. CCS, 2021.
- [3] David Balbás, Daniel Collins, and Serge Vaudenay. Cryptographic administration for secure group messaging. USENIX Security, 2023.







